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Abstract. Technology advancements have enabled the distribution and
sharing of patient personal health data over several data sources. Each
data source is potentially managed by a different organization, which ex-
pose its data as a Web service. Using such Web services, dynamic compo-
sition of atomic data type properties coupled with the context in which
the data is accessed may breach sensitive data that may not comply
with the users preference at the time of data collection. Thus, providing
uniform access policies to such data can lead to privacy problems. Some
fairly recent research has focused on providing solutions for dynamic pri-
vacy policy management. This paper advances these techniques, and fills
some gaps in the existing works. In particular, dynamically incorporating
user access context into the privacy policy decision, and its enforcement.
We provide a formal model definition of the proposed approach and a
preliminary evaluation of the model.
1 Introduction
Technology advancements enable the online collection and publication of vast
amount of data about individuals. Atomically, these data sources may not re-
veal personally identifiable information for individuals (e.g., HIPAA regulating
EHRs), but linking a number of distributed sources may lead to unintended
breach of privacy. We discuss privacy risks associated with personal health data
collection and subsequent sharing in service-oriented environments, which may
lead to breaching sensitive data by linking health data to other data in pub-
licly available records. Specifically, we target genomic data, which is potentially
transformative for public health. Gene sequencing data-collection has been on a
consistent (often exponential) rise for the past few years. The success of Gene se-
quencing as a tool for diagnosis has resulted in a recent announcement of the Ge-
nomic Sequencing and Newborn Screening Disorders (GSNSD) program; which
collects Genomic data of new-borns and keeps the data as hospital records. Data
sharing not only provides the ability to view data but also to further analyze
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it by linking it to other publicly available data sets. In service-oriented envi-
ronments, dynamic composition enables the specification of composite services
without knowing a priori which Web services will be actually used at run-time.
Such dynamic composition of different data items (retrieved through partici-
pating Web services), coupled with the context in which these data items are
accessed may reveal sensitive information, which was not deemed as such by
the user at the time of data collection. Thus, one challenge that service-oriented
environments pose is context-sensitivity. Context has been defined in the liter-
ature in terms of client trust, affiliation, query history, query type, temporal
or spatial relationships, among others. A context-aware system consists of an
infrastructure to capture context and a set of rules to govern how the system
should respond to context changes. Most context-aware systems do not take the
dynamicity at the rule level when they make their decisions. Researchers who
have proposed privacy policy management systems often used policy definitions
that are statically chosen by data owners at the time of data collection. How-
ever, context-sensitivity implies that data owner’s consent may not be enough
for data disclosure. Recently, few researchers proposed solutions to dynamically
handle context [6,9,11,3]. However, the dynamicity of these solutions is only at
the decision level, not at the rule level. The few approaches that have dealt with
rule-level dynamicity still predetermine the rule and the context types based on
a set of activities, states, and contexts in which the user could be [19]. Moreover,
these rules are not defined in semantic terms and do not govern what is poten-
tially sensitive data. Thus, we need a mechanism to dynamically identify what
is considered as potentially sensitive data and make a decision regarding data
disclosure not only based on the current context, but also based on the previous
context. We present an approach that defines privacy policy rules in terms of
concepts and relations from domain ontologies and dynamically handles context
by updating policy rules at the time of data access based on previous contexts.
Outline. The paper is organized as follows: First, we motivate the problem in
Section 2 by defining a scenario involving potential adversary actions. This is
followed by a formal definition of the proposed solution in Section 3. We then
provide our model evaluation in Section 4. Finally, we discuss some related works
(Section 5) and conclude.
2 Adversary Model Definition
Consider a collaborative health data sharing environment in which data is dis-
tributed among several organizations, each of which manages data access and
usage through a Web service WSi. Through each service interface, a requester
can perform a set of operations. Assume also that all the concepts that can be
searched for are stored in a generic ontology, which has a taxonomy for purposes
P and another for data type properties D. Each operation Opj exposed by WSi
queries an ontology-based repository and returns a set of data type properties
Dj . WSi defines a privacy policy for each patient instance in it’s repository.
Together with every instance, WSi records the patient’s predefined disclosure
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Table 1. Sample requests that reflect the scenario
Rj WSi/Opj Qj
Pj Dj
1 WS1(GenomicWS)/getGeneInfo() Research G,GL
2 WS1(GenomicWS)/getVariantInfo() Research RS,G,GL
3 WS1(GenomicWS)/getGenPhenAsso() Research PH,RS,G,VL
4 WS2(DrugWS)/getDrugInfo() Research D,DT,IG
5 WS3(ClinicalWS)/getPatientInfo() Research G,A,GE
6 WS3(ClinicalWS)/getPatientDiagnosis() Diagnosis PH,G,V,D,DT,IG,VD
7 WS3(ClinicalWS)/getPatientDiagnosis() Marketing PH,VL,D,A,GE,AD
8 WS3(ClinicalWS)/getPatientDiagnosis() Marketing PH,VL,DT,A,GE,AD
9 WS3(ClinicalWS)/getPatientDiagnosis() Marketing PH,G,V,VL,DT,A,GE,AD
10 WS3(ClinicalWS)/getPatientDiagnosis() Marketing PH,RS,G,GL,V,VL,D,DT,A,GE,AD
preferences over his data type properties and the purpose of disclosure. An ad-
versary submits a set of requests, each of which invokes an operation. A request
Rj eventually gets translated into a SPARQL query Qj .
Assume that the purposes from which a requester can choose are
represented by the set P = {Research,Diagnosis,Marketing}, and
the data type properties that a requester can ask for are Phenotype,
RsNo., GeneSymbol, GeneLocation, V ariant, V ariantLocation, Drug,
DrugTarget, InteractingGene, V isitDate, Age, Gender, Name, Address.
For simplicity, we refer to these data type properties as the set D =
{P,RS,G,GL, V, V L,D,DT, IG, V D,A,GE,N,AD}. Assume that the adver-
sary submits several requests to a number of Web services (Table 1) to perform
Genetic Variation Detection. In each request, the adversary claims a different
purpose asking for one of these data type properties. For example, in R1 he asks
for D1={G, GL} and indicates the purpose as P1={Research}. Then, in R2
he asks for D2={RS, G,GL} and indicates the purpose as P2={Research}.
In R3 he asks for D3={PH,RS,G, V L} and also indicates the purpose as
P3={Research}. Later, in R6 he asks for D6={PH, G, V , D,DT ,...}, but he
indicates the purpose as P6={Diagnosis}. The adversary asks for some of the
data type properties in more than one request to be able to link the data at
later stages. For example, the G and GL data type properties appear in the first
three requests. Later, in requests R7 through R10 the adversary links those data
type properties to other sensitive data type properties (e.g. A, GE, AD).
Moreover, the adversary may ask for data in subsequent phases seeking more
sensitive data in each phase. In an initial phase, he may submit initial exploratory
queries that do not explicitly ask for sensitive data. The purpose of those queries
is to probably get an overall view of the data. For example, he can first ask for
the gene (G) data of all patients that are within some age (A) range for Research
purposes. In later phases, he may look for patients who have been diagnosed for
depression for Diagnosis purpose. To this effect, he changes the purpose of the
query.
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We would like to monitor different aspects of user access context and return
data based on the inferred context. We wish to preserve privacy whenever values
of data type properties retrieved from different Web services are combined in
a way that violates privacy policy rules tied to those data type properties. We
achieve that by making WSi context-sensitive. Next, we present our solution by
defining our notion of context and we explain how we incorporate context into
dynamic privacy policy rule enforcement.
3 Dynamic Privacy Policy Management Solution
In our proposed architecture (Fig. 1), a requester enters the purpose Pj and
the Web service operation WSi/Opj . WSi has a Policy Enforcement Point PEP
agent client, which interprets the request as a SPARQL query Qj and forwards
it to the Semantic Handler (SH). The SH component runs QJ by an ontology-
based repository and passes the set of instances I that match the query together
with the query Qj to the Context Handler (CH). The Context Handler consists
of two sub components. The Classifier, which dynamically classifies a query
as being potentially malicious or legitimate, and the Sensitive Data Detector,
which dynamically determines the subset of data type properties in a query that
could potentially be sensitive. WSi uses the context CTXT inferred by it’s sub
components to update the context of each instance in I. The PEP uses CTXT to
make the final decision by performing Dynamic Rule Check (DRC) and Query
Rewriting (QR), which will be explained in Section 3. The PEP then looks up
the updated policy rule context and sends the response back to the user.
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Fig. 1. Dynamic privacy policy management solution.
For computational purposes, we express a query Qj that pertains to a request
Rj as a vector that consists of the purpose Pj and the set of data type properties
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Table 2. Queries as vectors of purposes and data type properties.
Qj Pj Dj
PH RS G GL V VL D DT IG VD A GE N AD
1 1.0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1.0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1.0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
5 1.0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
6 2.0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
7 3.0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
8 3.0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
9 3.0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
10 3.0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
Dj . For example, Table 2 shows the requests in Table 1 as query vectors. We
represent each purpose by a numerical value, and we represent each data type
property by a binary value, where 1 indicates that a data type property dk
appears in the query and 0 to indicate that dk does not appear in the query.
Algorithm 1 summarizes our context inference algorithm. We break our solution
to context inference into the following two sub problems:
Query Classification: For classifying queries we use the Naive Bayesian learn-
ing algorithm. The input to the learning algorithm is the query space QS and
the output is a classification Cj . We assume that the presence of one data type
property in a classification is conditionally independent of another data type
property. We also assume that the data type properties asked for in a query are
dependent on a query’s purpose. Based on that, we construct a Naive Bayesian
Classification model by converting a query Qi into a Bayesian Network, where
the root node represents a query’s purpose Pi and the children represent data
type properties d1, ..., dk. In the rest of the paper, we treat the data type proper-
ties in a query as a set Di. So, based on our definition, Pr(Di|Cj) is equivalent
to Pr(d1, d2, .., dk|Cj) which is equivalent to Pr(d1|Cj)Pr(d2|Cj)...P r(dk|Cj).
For each query Qi the learning algorithm is given the purpose Pi and the set
of data type properties Di. The parameters to be estimated are the purpose
Algorithm 1 Context Inference Algorithm
1. Input: QS,Qj ,M,DA, t
2. Output: CTXT
3. Cj ← QueryClassification(QS,Qj)
4. DB ← RelativeSensitivity(QS,Qj , t,DA)
5. if i mod M equals 0 then
6. trigger ← QueryDiversity(QS, t,M)
7. end if
8. CTXT ← Cj ∪DB ∪ trigger
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probabilities Pr(Pi) and the conditional probabilities Pr(Di|Pi). For example,
to predict the class label of a newly submitted query
Qi+1 = [Cj+1 =?, Pi+1 = Research,Di+1], where Di+1 = {PH,G,GL,RS,A, ...}
the algorithm computes Pr(Qi+1|Cj)Pr(Cj), for j = {malicious, legitimate}
based on the estimated parameters from the training data.
Algorithm 2 Relative Sensitivity Algorithm
1. input: QS,Qj , Dj , t,DA
2. output: DB
3. DB ← φ
4. if I(Dj , DA) ≥ t then
5. CPM ← ConditionalProbabilityMatrix(Dj , DA)
6. SV D ← SingularValueDecomposition(CPM)
7. DB ← DB∪ FindMax(SV D)
8. end if
9. for each Qk in QS do
10. if I(Dj , Dk) ≥ t then
11. CPM ← ConditionalProbabilityMatrix(Dj , Dk)
12. SV D ← SingularValueDecomposition(CPM)
13. DB ← DB∪ FindMax(SV D)
14. end if
15. end for
Sensitive Data Detection: For sensitive data detection, our goal is to deter-
mine, for a set of queries, a set of data type properties that could potentially
be sensitive even though the data has not been deemed sensitive at the time of
data collection. This problem reduces to two sub-problems:
Sensitivity of a Set of Data Type Properties: We apply conditional entropy to
measure the relative sensitivity of a subset DB of the set of data type properties
Di that is asked for in a newly submitted query with respect to two things. First,
users are often asked to make privacy decisions regarding their sensitive data
(e.g., Name) at the time of data collection. Let DA be the set of predetermined
sensitive data type properties. We apply conditional entropy to measure the
relative sensitivity of Di with respect to DA. Second, we measure the relative
sensitivity of Di with respect to all sets of data type properties D1, ..., Dk in
the previously submitted queries in QS. In both cases, we use the notion of
information gain as a measure of the mutual information between two random
variables. We define the information gain I(DA, Di) for Di with respect to DA,
as the reduction in uncertainty about the value of DA when the requester knows
the value of Di. Formally:
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I(DA, Di) = H(DA)−H(DA|Di)
H(DA) = −
∑
da∈DA
Pr(da)log2Pr(da)
H(DA|Di) = −
∑
da,di∈DA,Di
Pr(da, di)log2Pr(da|di)
We apply the same formulas above to measure I(Dk, Di). The relative sensi-
tivity algorithm (Algorithm. 2) first computes the information gain between the
sets Di and DA. It then computes the information gain between Di and each
set of data type properties D1, ..., Dk in the set of previously submitted queries
QS. If either case results in an information gain that is higher than a threshold
t, the algorithm distills the data type properties in Di that caused the highest
information gain. The algorithm does that by calculating the Singular Vector
Decomposition (SVD) of the conditional probability matrix (CPM) of Di and
Dk or DA. The singular vectors with the largest values indicate which subset of
Di and Dk or DA interact the most with each other. The resulting data type
properties are then added to the set of relatively sensitive data DB .
Data diversity for a set of queries. We use the notion of joint entropy as a
measure of data diversity. The diversity of a set of data depends on the number of
homogeneous groups of data and the proportion of attributes in each group. The
data set in our case is a set of submitted queries QS. Our desired metric shares
some properties that Shannon sought in his measure of information uncertainty.
First, if there are multiple possible options which are equally likely, there is more
uncertainty. Thus, the smaller the entropy, the fewer the number of different
queries or the more regular the queries are. Second, if a data set is defined as the
combination of several disjoint data sets, the entropy for them combined should
be at least the weighted sum of the individual entropy values for the individual
sets. In our case, for a query set QS composed of query subsets QSI and QSII
submitted in two phases, the overall entropy should be higher, or at least equal
to the weighted entropy of the query sets involved. Formally:
H(QS) = H(x, y) + xH(QSI) + yH(QSII), where x =
QSI
QS
, y =
QSII
QS
We use the above formula to measure the change in diversity among a set
of queries by determining the constant and varying attributes of QS assuming
all queries are submitted by the same source. The attributes in our case are the
purpose Pi and the set Di. In each phase, some query attributes are expected
to change abnormally. To measure this change we track the entropy for both
query attributes. Formally, for a query set QS we calculate the entropy H for
each group of homogeneous queries. We determine the homogeneity of a group
of queries based on the following criteria:
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Algorithm 3 Query Diversity Algorithm
1. input QS, t,M
2. output: trigger
3. QSselected ← φ,QSprevious ← φ,Hphase ← φ, count← 0, phase← 1
4. while count < size(QS) do
5. for each Qk in QS such that k ≤M do
6. QSselected ← QSselected ∪Qk
7. k ← k + 1
8. end for
9. Calculate diversity maps HP , HPD, HP |D
10. Update phase diversity map Hphase
11. Update QSprevious
12. phase← phase+ 1
13. count← count+M
14. end while
15. if DiversityChangeDetection(Hphase) ≥ t then
16. trigger ← 1
17. end if
– The purpose regardless of the data (P );
– The data given a purpose (D|P );
– Both attributes combined (PD).
We calculate the entropy for each criteria a as:
Ha(QS) = −
n∑
i=0
Pr(ai)log2Pr(ai), where a = {P,D|P, PD}
The diversity detection part of the sensitive data detector provides an extra
check for data sensitivity. The query diversity algorithm (Algorithm. 3) calcu-
lates the entropy for each criterion in a and creates a map of entropy values
for each phase. It then uses the resulting phase diversity map to monitor the
change in diversity between phases by comparing the change to a threshold t.
The algorithm takes the query space QS, the threshold t, and the number of
queries M to consider in each phase as inputs and returns a boolean value to
the context inference algorithm (Algorithm. 1) indicating whether there is an
attempt to breach sensitive data in the recently submitted query.
Dynamic Rule Check and Query Rewriting. After inferring the context,
the Web service updates the context block each instance in the set of matching
instances I in it’s repository (Fig. 1). The inferred context is a combination of
the classification Cj , the set DB , and the diversity trigger. In addition to the
context information, the query id Qi, the data Di, and purpose Pi are stored.
Listing 1.1 demonstrates an instance with recently stored context.
Listing 1.1. An instance with recently stored context
<rdf:RDF xmlns:mc="http://www.michcare.com/michcare.owl#">
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<mc:Patient rdf:about="patient1">
<mc:hasGene>HLA-B<mc:hasGene>
<mc:hasContext>
<mc:hasQi>1</mc:hasQi>
<mc:hasP>Research</mc:hasP>
<mc:hasD>Gene,Location,Drug,Age</mc:hasD>
<mc:hasDB>Gene,Age</mc:hasDB>
<mc:hasC>malicious<mc:hasC>
<mc:hasContext>
</rdf>
The Web service then uses the set I and the query Qj to perform Dynamic
Rule Check and Query Rewriting. For each instance in I, the policy rules that
govern each of the data type properties in Dj of that instance are checked to
see if the purpose Pj of the query matches the purpose indicated in each rule.
In the case of a purpose mismatch, the data type property will not be disclosed.
However, if a rule permits the disclosure of a data type property dk, further check
is performed to investigate if there are contradictions between the permissions
that a rule states regarding dk and the previously stored contexts of the matching
instances. First, if the query is classified as malicious, feature selection4 is used to
filter out the subset of data type properties D′j in the query that resulted in such
a classification. Second, a check is made to see if any of the data type properties
dk of Di is included in a previously detected relatively sensitive data set DB .
Finally, the diversity trigger is checked to determine if there has been irregularity
in the query sets due to the newly submitted query. If any data type property
dk requested in the query is either sensitive, relatively sensitive, resulted in a
malicious classification, or caused irregularity in the query set, the query Qj is
rewritten5 to exclude dk and the new query Q
′
j is run by the repository.
4 Evaluation
We implemented our context handler in Java using the Weka API [12] for the
classifier component and JavaMI API [7] for the query diversity and relative
sensitivity components. For relative sensitivity we used the Chi-Squared test to
measure the significance of the mutual information between two sets of data type
properties with an alpha level of 0.05. For query diversity, we chose an M value
of 5. To build our classification model we needed a set of labeled queries. Since
we did not have labeled queries we applied clustering to initial sets of queries.
Since our query data consists mostly of binary attributes, and since we want to
measure similarities between queries based on the ‘1’ value of the query attributes
then hierarchical clustering is most suitable in our case. To cluster the first set of
queries we applied four configurations of Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering
as implemented in Matlab: Single linkage using Jaccard Coefficient, Average
linkage using Jaccard Coefficient, Single linkage using Euclidean distance, and
4 We use feature selection techniques implemented in Weka.
5 For query rewriting, we use the query rewriting technique proposed in [5].
10 Ammar et al.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
False positive rate
Tr
ue
 p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
AUC
SLJ =0.5102
ALJ =0.25
SLE =0.5102
ALE =0.42931
 
 
JSL
JAL
ESL
EAL
Fig. 2. ROC curves of different clusterers.
Average linkage using Euclidean distance. We also implemented five Web services
(GenomicWS, DrugWS, ClinicalWS, PharmaWS, and DemogWS ).
Data sets. For the data sets we created RDF files using concepts from several
BioMedical ontologies, including NCBIGene,PharmKGB, DrugBank, CDT, and
GeneCDS available from [1]. We generated synthetic queries to simulate practical
cases in which one data type property appears repeatedly in different queries.
To generate a set of n queries, we first generated k core queries, each of which
has m data type properties. Then, n− k remaining queries were permuted from
the k previous ones.
Clustering Evaluation. We used the query sets from the first three iterations
to evaluate our clustering model. We first performed clustering based on the
first set of queries (training set). For the validation stage we used the second
set of queries (validation data) and we evaluated the clustering model based on
previous clusters. We compared the robustness of several clustering algorithms
using ROC by comparing a partition QSc of the query set QS obtained by the
clustering algorithm to a true partition QSt labeled based on our knowledge
of the queries. The knee of the ROC curve and the area under the curve AUC
(Fig. 2) indicate that the single linkage using Euclidean distance gave us the best
results. After evaluating the clustering model, we used another set of queries (test
data) to perform real clustering based on unseen labels and we used the resulting
clusters as labels to train our classification model.
Classifier Evaluation. We investigated two classification algorithms: Naive
Bayes and KNN. We used the clustered queries (third labeled query set) to train
our classifiers. The ROC curve in Fig. 3 indicate that the NB algorithm gave us
better results than the KNN algorithm.
Results. The results of running the classification model on the query sets from
the third, fourth, and fifth iterations indicate that the relative sensitivity results
agree with the classification results 60% of the time for the third iteration, 30%
of the time for the fourth iteration, and 40% of the time for the fifth iteration.
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The classification results indicated 60% of the queries in the third iteration, 60%
queries in the fourth iteration, and 80% of the queries in the fifth iteration to be
malicious. The relative sensitivity results indicated that 80% of the queries in
the third iteration contained a subset of data type properties that is relatively
sensitive. Half of those queries contained data that was sensitive relative to DA
while the other half was sensitive relative to some other set Dk in some previously
submitted query. In the fourth iteration, only 20% of queries contained relatively
sensitive data, half of which where sensitive relative to DA while the rest were
relative to some other set Dk in a previously submitted query. 40% queries in
the fifth iteration contained relatively sensitive data, most of which contained
data sensitive relative to DA.
Table 3 provides details of query diversity results for each phase of the third,
fourth, and fifth iterations. The table shows both entropy values per phase and
diversity changes between phases. We focus on the cases where the entropy values
are 0.0 which suggest that all queries had the same value for an attribute and
the cases where the entropy is 1.0 which suggest that the queries had equal
number of each attribute value. For example, entropy values for the purpose
attribute (HP) in the second phase of the third iteration match the relative
sensitivity results for the last four queries of the third iteration. The diversity
results indicate that in the third iteration, the purposes of the submitted queries
were equally likely for phase one while in phase two all submitted queries were
for the same purpose. The diversity in purposes increased until phase 4 when
it remained around 2.0. For the purpose and data combined (HPD) the results
did not indicate interesting entropy values or significant increase or decrease in
diversity. A closer look at the entropy results for the data per purpose (HPID)
suggest that for most of the purposes in the third iteration the entropy per
phase is 0.0 and so is the diversity which indicate similarities among queries in
the initial phases which match the results from the other components.
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Table 3. Results from our diversity handler for three of the iterations.
Iteration3 Iteration4 Iteration5
Ph HP HPD HDIP Ph HP HPD HDIP Ph HP HPD HDIP
1 0.97 1.92
P1 1.58
3 1.5 2.32
P1 0.0 5 1.37 2.32 P1 1.6
P2 0.0 P2 1.0 P2 0.0
P3 0.0 P3 1.0 P3 0.0
2 0.0 0.72
P1 0.0 H 2.0 3.22 P1 1.14 H 2.08 4.1 P1 1.5
P2 0.0 P2 1.53 P2 1.56
P3 0.0 P3 0.13 P3 1.0
H 1.48 2.32
P1 0.47 4 1.37 2.32 P1 0.0 6 1.44 3.32 P1 1.6
P2 0.86 P2 1.6 P2 0.0
P3 0.0 P3 0.0 P3 0.0
H 2.15 3.64 P1 1.1 H 2.08 3.28 P1 1.8
P2 1.6 P2 2.0
P3 1.0 P3 1.1
5 Related Work
We present some of the proposed approaches for privacy policy management.
Context-based Privacy Policy Management. Most context-aware sys-
tems do not take the dynamicity at the rule level when they make their de-
cisions [6,9,11,3]. Some of these approaches dynamically handle a user request
by applying techniques that regulate rather than prevent the data access such
as HDB [11,3]. The dynamic trust adjustment model proposed in [6] also dy-
namically handles context. Their approach focuses on access control, where the
focus is mainly on who has access to the information as opposed to what actually
have been collected. Also, their approach relies on inferring context using sensed
spatial and temporal information and they do not achieve dynamicity at rule
level. Among the relatively few researchers who took dynamicity of a context to
a higher level by considering dynamicity of a rule is Pallapa et al. [19]. Pallapa
et al. proposed a context aware scheme for privacy preservation by maintaining
a model of the user’s environment, which is characterized by user’s activities
and situations. Their solution accounts for fine grained rules and they apply a
dynamic rule generator. However, both the rule and the context types are still
predetermined based on a set of activities, states, and contexts in which the user
could be. Also, these rules are not defined in semantic terms and do not govern
what is potentially sensitive data. Our approach transparantly updates policy
rules based on dynamically inferring a query’s classification, what is considered
relatively sensitive data, and diversity of queries.
Semantic-based Privacy Policy Management. To our knowledge, few re-
cent researchers used semantic concepts for defining privacy policies. For in-
stance, Ferrini et al. [9] used XACML obligations to add axioms to an ontology
using semantic functions, and they checked for inconsistencies introduced in the
ontology due to adding those axioms. We use a similar approach to dynamically
add contextual information to an instance to make the rules that govern the
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data type properties of that instance smarter. However, our approach adds the
inferred context to the instance and uses the inferred context to impose more
strict rules in the corresponding policy. Thus, both the ontology instance and the
policy definition of that instance stay in sync. Among the approaches that pro-
posed solutions for defining policies on top of domain ontologies are [8,20,4,22].
The work by Rahmouni et al. [20] stemmed from issues of diversity, complex-
ity, and dynamicity of the rules governing privacy protection. They proposed a
modeling approach to abstract rule complexities and facilitate the automation
and enforcement of rules at the process level. The closest approach to ours is
the one by Barhamji et al. [4]. While they ensure the dynamicity of a decision
by rewriting a query, they still rely on predefined user preferences and they do
not incorporate dynamically inferred context.
Privacy Policy Enforcement. Several technologies have been applied to
achieve privacy policy enforcement by considering the requester’s permission and
the owner’s consent [17,11,3]. Similar to our approach, those approaches do not
rely on a third party for enforcement purposes. Grandison [11] and Agrawal [3]
have both leveraged the Active Enforcement module of the Hippocratic Database
technology (HDB) by transforming an original query to another query that is
policy-compliant. They also track the purpose of a query to determine if a query
is suspicious or not, but they detect that only after the fact.
Sensitive Data Detection. Some notable techniques that applied machine
learning, data mining, or information theory for sensitive data detection in-
clude [2,21,15,13]. These techniques focus on data privacy from a “mining” view.
Agrawal et al. [2] have done valuable work on privacy preserving data mining.
In their work they defined conditional privacy using conditional entropy and
information loss. We leverage similar data mining techniques to define our con-
text and we incorporate the context into our privacy policy rule enforcement.
However, their notion of conditional privacy compares the distribution of the
original data to that of the perturbed data to test if the original value can be
guessed from the perturbed value. In contrast, our approach uses only the origi-
nal data by comparing the data that appears in a newly submitted query to both
the previously determined set of sensitive data and all the previously submitted
data sets to dynamically identify potential breach of more sensitive data. Nguyen
and Choi [18] used Bayesian classification to classify Web services. Agrawal et
al. have developed a classification model which is then sent to the user to rank
search results to maintain their privacy. If a user generates a search request, the
website returns to him complete search results along with a data mining model
for ranking search results based on classification. The user’s computer then uses
the model to process the original data to return a classification which is then
used to rank search results as a convenience for the user. Thus, private user data
is not accessed by the website and is used only to produce the model then the
model is sent back to the user’s machine.
Several approaches have been proposed to achieve privacy by generalizing
data to form more abstract information to avoid breaching sensitive data. Sweeny
et al. [21] proposed the k-Anonymity approach. Some issues in their approach
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include utility loss and high dimensionality of anonymized data. To overcome
some of those limitations, Wang et al. [23] proposed confidence bounding and
Machanavajjhala et al.[15] proposed the l-diversity approach. Mohammad et
al. [16] proposed an enhancement over the aforementioned approaches by in-
troducing LKC-privacy, which is a generalization of both approaches with more
reasonable constraints on parameters. Fung et al. [10] have recently developed an
algorithm that uses LKC-privacy to preserve privacy of data mashup by multiple
service providers.
Our approach for sensitive data detection is complementary to other ap-
proaches including the notion of cover in association rule mining to determine
the set of representative association rules [13] and the notion of perfect privacy
using query containment mapping [14]. Query containment have been proposed
by Machanavajjhala et al. [14] for ensuring perfect privacy for relational data.
Based on that, Barhamji et al. [4] extended the approach to data mashups.
They used query containment mapping in their query rewriting approach but
they applied it to RDF views.
6 Conclusion
We provided a formal model for privacy policy management that incorporates
dynamic context handling into privacy policy rule enforcement. Our future work
includes addressing other issues that service-oriented environments entail, incor-
porating other adversarial scenarios, enhancing our approach by exploring other
data mining techniques, and implementing our approach using a privacy policy
standard. Future work also includes extensive evaluation of the implementation
to assess the performance and the accuracy of the approach. Also, we will incor-
porate security techniques and support them with soundness proofs. Based on
our evaluation, we hope that future enhancements of the proposed model will
serve as a foundation for health records infrastructures and inspire productive
research in information sharing and management.
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